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R. P. Sylvester and the
Moral Philosophy of G. E. Moore
by RA Y PERKINS
HEN

I was a student at Colby in the early 1960s, I had the good fortune of

knowing and studying under Professor Robert Reuman. I remember most
W
vividly his highly stimulating seminar in contemporary moral philosophy. I
recall an early lecture which he began with the riveting phrase, "When I was in
prison ... ," and he proceeded to illustrate several points of moral theory with
examples from his own experience as a conscientious objector during World War
II. I thought to myself at the time, "Here is a philosopher who understands and
takes seriously the connection between moral theory and practice."
It was also in that seminar that I was introduced to G. E. Moore's important
1903 work, Principia Ethica. Moore's book is perhaps best known for its
theoretical--or rather, metaethical-analyses of the meaning of moral language
and basic moral concepts. But he was at least equally concerned with the practical
side of ethics, especially with the question of how we ought to conduct our lives.
What follows is a discussion of some of the issues raised by Robert Peter
Sylvester's recent book, The Moral Philosophy of G. E. Moore (Temple University Press, 1990), a work which I edited with
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What things are good and in what degree? And the practical ethical question:
What ought I to do?
in the first part of what follows I would like to look briefly at what I take to
be the most important examples ofSyIvester's fresh perspectives on Moore in his
attempt to "get him right." Specifically, I want to cite: (A) his view of Moore's
alleged intuitionism; (B) his explication of Moore's obscure doctrine of nonnaturalism; and (C) his revelations concerning Bishop Butler's maxim and its
alleged connection with Moore's naturalistic fallacy. In the second part I wish
to consider an interesting speculation of Sylvester~s concerning Moore's conception of duty and to comment on what some might see as a source of tension
in that account between Moore's conservative and nonconservative tendencies.

A. Let's look first at the issue of Moore's intuitionism. According to Sylvester
HIt is ... a plain mistake for anyone to classify G. E. Moore as an intuitionist with
respect to obligation, duty or the rightness of an action" (p. 38). Yet many, like
George Santayana, have so classified him. As Sylvester makes clear, it is only
with respect to nloral philosophy's second question-what things are good and
in what degree?-that intuition plays a direct role for Moore. And even here,
contrary to what Stephen C. Pepper and others have claimed, intuition is not
epistemically absolute. One can be mistaken. indeed Sylvester shows, by means
ofMoore'sdiscussionofSidgwick's intuition (that pleasure alone is intrinsically
good), the sense in which, and the extent to which, intuitions may themselves be
supplied with reasons and subject to philosophical argument. The main point
about Moore's nloral intuition is that we can know intuitively what specific things
are good (ought to be), but there is no such mode of cognition regarding what
specific actions are our duty (ought to be done), though we can know intuitively
(Moore says in Ethics that it's "self-evidenf') the general proposition that our
duty is always to maximize good. Sylvester also notes that this latter point has
led some notable scholars-he nlentions both A. C. Ewing and Mary Warnockto take jt to be Moore's view that duty, like good, is a simple, indefinable notion.
Another '4 plain mistake."
B. Consider the issue of what is sometimes called Moore's non-naturalism,
i.e., the doctrine that good is a non-natural property. it has been widely held, and
perhaps rightly, that Moore's distinction in Principia between natural and nonnatural properties is hopelessly muddled. Yet few have bothered to look at that
distinction in terms of the metaphysical doctrines that Moore was propounding
at or near the time he was writing Principia. From Moore's 1899 paper "On the
Nature of Judgment" (a paper once descri bed by Bertrand Russell as the paper
from which he [Russell] derived his position on the chief questions of philosophy) Sylvester is able to glean insight into the nature of value judgments and truth
as Moore may have been thinking of them in Principia Ethica. From that paper
and others (e.g., "Identity," 1901) he is also able to gain some understanding of
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Moore's peculiar blend of Platonic and Aristotelian realism that comes into play
in Moore's conception of good as a non-natural property. And with the help of
some of Herbert Hochberg's ontological ideas, Sylvester is able to provide a
coherent account of what he calls "good's ingression into the world of existence"
(p. 143). In short, good is a real, universal concept which may be exemplified by
phenomenal objects. But its exemplifications do not constitute any objects in the
way in which substantial, phenomenal qualities do. The latter, but not the former,
have their own substantiality; they are what Sylvester calls "simple particulars";
they are what Moore calls "natural properties." By contrast, good's exemplifications depend on substantial natural properties in a sense in which the natural
properties do not depend on good's exemplifications. This dependence, Sylvester
says, is lawlike though it is a stronger dependence than that of ordinary causal
law. And although neither Moore nor Sylvester uses the term "supervenience,"
it is clear that what Sylvester gives us in his account of ingression is an
ontological account of the supervenience of good as Moore conceived of it in his
moral philosophy.
C. Consider also Moore's naturalistic fallacy and its alleged dependency on
Bishop Butler's maxim that "Everything is what it is and not another thing."
Many moral philosophers-William Frankena and R. M. Hare among themhave assumed that the point of Butler's maxim is to underscore the indefinability
of good. Since good, like everything, is what it is and not another thing, any
definition of good would violate the maxim, or so these philosophers suppose
Moore to have believed. But, as Sylvester makes clear, Butler's maxim has
nothing to do with Moore's thesis of the indefinability of good. On Moore's view
good is indefinable, not because it is the thing it is but because it is the simple
thing (concept) it is. It is the simplicity of good (qua concept) that is the central
point about the naturalistic fallacy. Indeed, in the passage in Principia (p. 206)
where Moore cites the Butler maxim, the question of the definability of good is
not at issue. Rather, the issue is Moore's second question, viz., what things are
good? I.e., the issue is one of enumerating the kinds of things that exemplify
good, not one of finding the definition or analysis of the concept so exemplified.
It is in this connection (the second question) that Moore cites the Butler maxim.
And his point is one having to do with his doctrine of organic unities, viz., that
things exemplifying good are organic wholes and the value of those wholes bears
no necessary relation to the values of the parts.
It would seem, then-certainly Sylvester would say so--that many of
Moore's critics have failed to keep Moore's distinct questions distinct. Some,
like Pepper, have conflated the second and third questions; others, like Frankena,
have conflated the second and the first.
II
I TU R N now to some of Sylvester's speculations about Moore's notion of duty
and certain tensions connected with it. In his final chapter Sylvester claims to find
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in Moore a concept of duty-which Sylvester calls moral duty-that stands in
contrast to Moore's utilitarian ideal duty-which Sylvester calls ontological
duty. It is a more subjective and personal notion. In Sylvester's view, moral duty
presupposes a moral context which is perceived and "lived through" by an
individual self of intrinsic value capable of free choice and engaged in a process
of rational deliberation. This, one might think, is at least a potential prescription
for individualism and even nonconformism in the moral life. But Sylvester also
tells us that owing to the difficulty of knowing the long-range effects of
individual human actions and, hence, of knowing our ontological duty, Moore
turns to the established social rules as a way of determining
detennining what we morally
ought to do. And Moore says, as Sylvester notes, "The individual can therefore
be confidently recommended always to conform to rules which are both generally
useful and generally practiced" (Sylvester, p. 119; P.E., p. 164). But this seems
to be a prescription for a kind of collective conservatism, and the moral life
threatens to reduce itself to mere sociaJ conformism. On the face of it, then, we
seem to have a paradox. In short, what becomes of moral deliberation and
individual freedom of choice if morality becomes a mere matter of conforming
to the norms of society?
I an] going to end up claiming that the tension within Moore's practical ethics
is more apparent than real and that close attention to the text will show that
Moore's conformism is of a limited sort. This, not unchallenged, interpretation
is one that has been put forward in recent years by Tom Regan in his important
book Bloomsbury's Prophet: G. E. Moore and the Development of His Moral
Philosophy (Temple, 1986). First, however, I should like to sketch Sylvester's
ideas about the two notions of duty which he claims to find in Moore.
What Sylvester calls "ontological duty" is the view usually ascribed to Moore
and found clearly stated in both Principia and Ethics. One's duty is simply to do
that act which maximizes intrinsic value. The paradoxes of this view were noted
as early as J 904 by Bertrand Russell. Can it really be my duty to do that which
maximizes value even if I am not cognizant of it? And can it really be my duty
to do such an act even if J believe mistakenly but reasonably that some other act
would be better? These considerations lead to a more subjecti ve notion which
Sylvester claims to find in a rudimentary form in Principia (pp. 149-51), where
Moore distinguishes between "possible actions" open to an agent (whether the
agent is aware of them or not) and "actions of which it is possible to think" (i.e.,
actions which it is likely that the agent will think of). The point is that although
a certain action A may be my ontological duty in the sense that it really will bring
about more good than any other thing that I could do, still there is another sense
of duty such that if, in the course of my deliberation, A never crossed my mind,
and could not reasonably have been expected to, then A could not be my duty.
Moral duty, then, requires a certain cognizance or awareness on the part ofthe
agent. But Sylvester insists that something else is required as well. Moral duty
also requires that the context for deciding what to do-for moral choice-be
defined by the question "What ought I to do?" And here he seems to mean that
it is Moore's view that no one can truJy be said to do his/her moral duty unless
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he/she is deliberately trying to detennine what course of action will be most
likely to maximize value. The connection between moral duty and ontological
duty is that the latter is, as Sylvester says, the "conceptual backdrop" for the
former (p. 114 and p. 188). Though our ontological duty may be hopelessly
beyond our ken, we can achieve our moral duty, but only by deliberately seeking
our ontological duty.
This is where society's established rules come into the picture. They provide
us with a route to actions that are generally a means to maxinlal good though they
may not be so in any particular case. In Moore's words:
h seems. then. that with regard to any rule which is generally usefuL we may assert that it ought
always be observed. not on the ground that in every particular case it will be useful, but on the ground
that in any particular case the probability of its being so is greater than that ofour being likely to decide
rightly that we have before us an instance of disutility. in short. though we may be sure that there are
cases where the rule should be broken. we can never know which those cases are. and ought,
therefore. never to break it. (P.E.. pp. 163-64)

Here we seem to encounter this distinct sense of duty as moral duty. Indeed,
both senses seem to be present in this single passage. For consider a case where,
according to Moore, a rule ought to be broken but, since I do not know that it
ought to be, I ought not to break it. Surel y there is an appeal to duty here in a sense
other than ontological duty. If not, Moore is guilty of asserting a flat contradiction.
It should be noted that in his 1912 Ethics, although Moore has almost nothing
to say about social rules, he does seem to recognize something very much like
Sylvester's moral duty in addition to ontological duty, but he prefers to consider
it in terms of the agent's praiseworthiness or blameworthiness rather than duty
per see Thus on p. 121 of that work, as Sylvester notes, Moore resigns himself to
the paradox of saying that one may deserve the strongest moral blame for doing
one's duty (since the agent was not justified in believing that the action was
value-maximizing). But I take this to be merely a terminological preference on
Moore's part. The conceptual details underlying what Sylvester calls moral duty
really do seem to be there in Moore's thought, however one chooses to label them.
But all this brings us back to our ini tial paradox: if epistemic considerations
force us to seek the social rules for an answer to the practical ethical question
HWhat ought I to do?" does not the moral life ultimately reduce itself to a kind
of social conformism? And, if so, what becomes of, what's the point of, moral
deliberation, human freedom, and the intrinsic worth of persons? Though
certainly not in strict contradiction with a thoroughgoing confonnism, such ideas
are difficult to reconcile with it. The answer, as I suggested earlier, is that Moore
does not errlbrace a thoroughgoing conformism. Nor does Sylvester say that he
does. The facts seem to be that even in Principia Moore subscribes to a limited
conformism.
Recall that it was because of the difficulty of knowing the effects of our
actions in individual cases that Moore turns to the societal rules. But obedience
to the rules is only morally required, says Moore, in those cases where the rules
are generally practiced and generally useful. Moreover, Moore imposes an
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epistemic requirement here as well. The rules which demand our obedience must
have a general utility which is provable, or, as he sometimes puts it, their utility
must be "certain" (P.E., p. J 62). Moore is somewhat vague as to what exactly is
supposed to constitute a proof, but he says ""... a proof of general utility is so
difficult, that it can hardly be conclusive except in a very few cases. It is certainly
not possible with regard to all actions which are generally practiced" (P.E., p.
165). It is reasonably clear that Moore believes that the genera]
general utility of society's
prohibitions on murder and theft are "certain" but less clear what other social
rules would meet this epistemic test. (His remarks about rules governing sexual
conduct, for exan1ple, suggest that their utility, being contingent upon factors
"more or less likely to alter," may be less than certain [P.E., pp. ) 58-60].)
Following his remark on p. ) 65 about the difficulty of proof, he contin ues in the
next paragraph:
The extreme inlprobability that any general rule with regard to utility of an action will be correct
seems, in fact. to be the chief principle which should be taken into account in discussing how the
individual should guide his choice.

What this seems to come to is that in a large nun1ber of cases, perhaps most,
the utility of the rule in question is less than certain, i.e., it is subject to doubt. And
in such cases his recommendation is clear:
in cases of doubt. instead of following rules. of which he is unable to see the good effects in his
particular case, the individual should rather guide his choice by a direct consideration of the intrinsic
value or vileness of the effects which his action may produce. (P.E .. p. 166)

So Moore's is a limi ted conformism. Only in some cases-perhaps fewer than
the majority of cases-can we rely on rules to tell us what actions are most likely
to maximize value. In the last analysis, with the exception of those established
rules which apparently constitute only "'a very few cases," we are on our own in
our deliberation both as to a determination of what actions will maximize value
and as to what things possess it intrinsicalJy. Here, of course, there is much room
for error. But there is also room for individualism and even nonconformity. This
is Tom Regan's point. But Sylvester is surely right to call attention in Moore to
a notion of moral duty distinct from ontological duty that depends on a moral
context involving moraJ deliberation and individual choice. And this moral
context will undoubtedly come into full bloom in those cases where rules fail to
apply-whether because the cases fall outside the scope of the rules or because
the rules themselves may be less than certain. But he is also undoubtedly correct
in emphasizing that the well-established ruJes of society will play an important
part in that notion of duty though, from what Moore himself says, our moraJ duty
needn't be supposed to coincide with the application of the existing set of social
rules.
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